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IN TilE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BELLE ERICKSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
WALGREEN DRUG CO., a corpora-
tion, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
THE SALISBURY INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
THE FACTS 
Case No. 
7444 
This is an appeal by the defendant, Walgreen Drug 
Company, from a verdict and judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff and against the defendant, Walgreen Drug 
Company, in the amount of $8,000.00 for personal in-
juries sustained by the plaintiff when she fell at the 
entrance to the Walgreen Drug Company store in Salt 
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Lake City, Utah. As against the co-defendant, Salisbury 
Investment Company, the jury rendered a verdict of no 
cause of action, and the said Salisbury Investment Com-
pany is not a party to this appeal. 
In this brief we shall refer to the parties as they 
appeared in the Court below, except that the word "de-
fendant'' shall be understood to mean only the defend-
ant Walgreen Drug Company, unless the context other-
wise indicates. 
The defendant is a corporation engaged in the drug 
store business in Salt Lake City, Utah, and operating 
a drug store on the southeast corner of Second South 
and Main Street, in a building owned by the co-defend-
ant, Salisbury Investment Company, and occupied by 
the defendant as lessee. (R. 31, 53.) 
The public entrance to the defendant's store is at 
_the northwest corner of the building, and consists of a 
revolving door with ordinary doors on either side of 
the revolving door. The entrance is set back from the 
north and west pro;perty lines, and faces in a generally 
northwesterly direction. There is a roof or canopy 
over the entrance or approach, which leads from the 
sidewalks to the doors. (R. 162, Ex. 1.) 
The floor of the approach or entranceway is of a 
material known as terrazzo. It has a gentle slope from 
the doors toward the sidewalk on a line from the re-
volving door to the corner of the property line. The 
slope is .23% from southeast to northwest on a line 
running from the center of the revolving door to the 
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northwest corner of the property line. From the door 
south of the reYolYing door, the slope is 1% from east 
to west. (R. 1:29, Ex. 3.) 
On and prior to Septen1ber 25, 1948, the plaintiff 
was employed by the Stover Bedding Company (R. 129). 
On that date, she left work about 1:00 o'clock and went 
home, (purchasing sOine groceries enroute), changed 
clothes and caught a bus for the business section of 
town. She rode the bus to the intersection of Second 
South and l\Iain Streets, alighting on the northwest 
corner of the intersection. It was starting to rain at 
the time she left home (R. 125-126) and it was wet and 
raining when the plaintiff arrived down town. She 
crossed Main Street and then Second South Street, thus 
placing herself on the southeast corner of the inter-
section and directly in front of the entrance to the de-
fendant's store.· (R. 127.) 
The plaintiff intended to go into the defendant's 
store for the purpose of making a purchase. She ap-
proached the south door of the entrance from a point 
almost due west thereof on the sidewalk (R. 128). At 
the time she approached the store, she noticed that the 
terrazzo entranceway was wet. (R. 127, 172). When 
she was about four feet from the door, she reached out 
to open it, and in doing so slipped, falling on her side, 
sustaining the injuries for which she recovered judg-
ment in the trial Court. She stated that the entrance-
way was smooth, slick and wet, and that it sloped. (R. 
129.) The iplaintiff had walked several steps on the 
terrazzo before falling. (R. 165.) She stated that the 
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entire terrazzo surface was wet and apparently the 
water had been tracked in. (R. 165.) She was walking 
at an ordinary gait, that is, the gait of an average per-
son, as she approached the doorway. She stated that at 
the time she reached for the door, her left foot was for-
ward and that her right foot slipped backward, causing 
her to fall on her right hip. (R. 170.) 
The plaintiff was thoroughly familiar with terrazzo 
entrances and had walked on such entrances many times. 
(R. 173-174.) 
At the time of the accident the plaintiff was wear-
ing shoes with heels which she described as "Cuban 
heels," which were approximately 1lf2 to 2 inches high. 
The heels were not of rubber, but of leather. They were 
somewhat worn at the rear and on the outside so that 
the nails were exposed and had been somewhat flattened 
out and formed a rather smooth surface. (R. 118, Ex. 2~) 
Plaintiff commenced this action against the de-
fendant and alleged as negligence: (a) that the en-
tranceway was constructed with a slight grade and of a 
material which was smooth and polished and when wet 
became very slick and slippery; and (b) that the de-
fendant was negligent in failing to give warning to its 
customers of the slippery condition of the entranceway 
and in failing to place rubber mats or otper protective 
n1~aterial. over the entranceway when defendant knew, 
or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, 
that the entranceway would be slick ·and slippery by 
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was constructed. 
Darrell Erickson, the plaintiff's son, testified that 
he had observed that the entranceway to the defendant's 
store was slippery when wet, and that on various occa-
sions he had seen rubber mats placed on the entrance-
way (R. 199-200). The mats were opposite the revolving 
door, (R. 202), and not in front of the south door. 
Several expert witnesses testified as to the relative 
safety of the entr-anceway. 
Frank A. Caffall, a tile contractor, called by the 
plaintiff, testified that he could not tell from its ap-
pearance whether the terrazzo entranceway to defend-
ant's store had non-skid material or not (R. 183, 187), 
but if it did have abrasive material in it, it would be 
non-skid. (R. 188.) 
On cross examination he admitted that many ter-
razzo entrances on Main Street of Salt Lake City were 
sloped more steeply than the entrance to the defendant's 
store. He also admitted the slope wasn't excessive, and 
that without any slope the entranceway would be only 
a little slippery when wet. (R. 180.) He further ad-
mitted that some tile is as slippery as terrazzo, (R. 191), 
and that when cement is worn smooth it is as slippery 
as terrazzo. ( R. 193.) 
W. Y. Tipton, the superintendent of the Bureau of 
Mechanical Inspection of Salt Lake City (R. 209) and a 
licensed engineer (R. 210) testified that there were many 
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terrazzo entrances in Salt Lake City, and that most of 
thmn had a greater slope than the entranceway to the 
defendant's store. (R. 213-214). He also stated that the 
ordinary slope of sidewalks in Salt Lake City is 14 of 
,an inch to a foot or about 2%. (R. 213.) The slope of 
the entranceway to the defendant's store in an east to 
west direction from the south door of the entranceway 
was 1%, (R. 211), and at a point four feet west of the 
south door the north to south slope was 1.1% (R. 226). 
On cross-examination, he testified that the sidewalk 
around the defendant's store was as smooth as terrazzo 
' 
and would have about the same co-efficiency of friction 
(R. 218-219). 
Raymond J. Ashton, an architect of 30 years experi-
ence, who was associated with Gordon V. Kaufman in 
designing the building which defendant occupies (R. 230) 
testified that the specifications for the building called 
for carborundum to be spread into the finished coat, 
which would act as an abrasive in the terrazzo. (R. 231.) 
The drawing called for a slope of 1j16 of an inch to 
the foot, which is about 14 of the normal slope. The 
entranceway to the store was unusually flat,-flatter by 
far than the average entranceway. (R. 232.) The type 
of construction employed in the defendant's entrance-
way was the safest type of construction that the pro-
fession had been able to employ. 
On cross examination, he stated that the terrazzo 
entranceway had abrasive in it (R. 233-234) and that 
he could feel the carborundum grit present in the ter-
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razzo. (R. 234, 235.) The entranceway was sloped in 
two directions, but the slope was almost imperceptible. 
(R. 134-13J.) 
~Ir. Ashton also testified that a soft nrarble floor 
and a tile floor are In ore hazardous than terrazzo. ( R. 
136-137.) Architects specify carborundun1 in terrazz:) 
so that rubber mats will not be necessary for skid pro-
tection. ( R. 138.) 
Dr. George R. Hill, an Assistant Professor at the 
University of Utah, with a doctor's degree in physical 
chemistry, who was at the time of the trial engaged in 
work on surface chemistry products for the Navy (R. 
239) testified that he had verformed certain experi-
ments upon the terrazzo entranceway to the defendant's 
store, and also upon the city sidewalk adjacent to it,· 
and that the said surfaces had the same co-efficiency 
of friction when dry. (R. 241.) His experiments also 
revealed that both the sidewalk and terrazzo had a 
higher co-efficiency for static friction when wet than 
when dry (R. 242), and that it would require more force 
to start a foot sliding on wet terrazzo than on dry ter-
razzo. (R. 243.) He further stated that a person walk-
ing normally and straight ahead upon wet terrazzo sur-
face, would have an increased friction, that is, it would 
be harder for such person's foot to start sliding on a 
wet surface than on a dry surface. (R. 245.) He stated 
that terrazzo flooring was the most common type now 
in use, but that marble, tile, cement and ·asphalt were 
also used. In his opinion the entranceway to the Wal-
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O'reen store was a safe surface. Dr. Hill also explained 
b 
that water on the surface of a terrazzo entrance would 
act as a lubricant so that if a foot started to slide it 
would then continue to slide along the surface. (R. 248.) 
As to the surface to the defendant's entranceway, quite 
a number of irregularities in the surface of the floor 
were apparent to the touch (R. 250), and the carborun-
dum had not worn off. (R. 252.) 
Herbert Leichter testified that he had made a count 
of the various types of entranceways to the stores and 
business houses along Main Street, between South 
Temple Street and Fourth South Street in Salt Lake 
City, and he had found that in that district there were 
81 entrances of terrazzo and 82 entrances composed of 
other types of material combined-tile, cement, marble 
and other compositions. (R. 255-256.) Most of these 
entrances were oven to the weather, but a few had storm 
doors. Some of the store keepers had rubber mats out 
at the time the witness made his count, which was dur-
ing stormy weather. (R. 257.) 
The defendant offered to prove by the testimony of 
Mr. Conley, the manager of defendant's store, that ap-
proximately 4,000 to 5,000 people eame into its store 
every day, and that in the past fourteen or-fifteen years 
it had never come to the attention of the defendant that 
anyone had ever slipped on the. terrazzo 'entrance, either 
when it was wet or dry. The plaintiff objected to the 
testimony and it was rejected by the Court. (R. 263, 
264, 275.) A similar offer on the part of the defendant, 
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Salisbury Investment Company, was likPwist> rejected 
by the Court on objection by plaintiff. 
\Ye have not detailed in our statement of facts the 
injuries suffered by the plaintiff, since they are not ma-
terial to the issues of this appeal. 
Summarizing briefly the testimony of the expert 
·witnesses, it may be stated that the entranceway to the 
defendant's store has a slight, or almost im,perc~ptible 
slope; that the slope is considerably less than the slope 
ordinarily present in entranceways to business build-
ings in this locality and is less than that present in the 
ordinary city sidewalks. It is constructed of a material 
which is at least as safe as other types of building ma-
terials commonly used in entranceways in Salt Lake 
City, and which is the most common type employed for 
that purpose, and is at least as safe as the city side-
walks adjacent to the store. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
I. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
SUPPORT A FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART 
OF THIS DEFENDANT, AND THE VERDICT IS UNSUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
II. THE VERDICT IS INCONSISTENT AND CON-
TRARY TO THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT AND 
AGAINST LAW. 
III. THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING DEFEND-
ANT'S PROFERRED TESTIMONY TO THE EFFECT THAT 
THERE HAD BEEN NO ACCIDENTS AT THE PLACE IN 
QUESTION DURING THE 15 YEARS PRIOR TO THE 
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TRIAL EXCEPT THE ACCIDENT INVOLVING THIS 
PLAINTIFF. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD 
TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE ON 
THE PART OF THIS DEFENDANT, AND 
THE VERDICT IS UNSUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
It is a fundamental principle that a land owner is 
not an insurer of the safety of persons whom he has 
invited to enter upon his premises. 38 Am. Jur. 92, 96, 
131, 134. The only duty upon the part of the land owner 
is to exercise ordinary care for the safety of his in-
vitees. The duty is not to exercise reasonable care to 
see that the premises are absolutely safe, but rather to 
exercise ordinary care to see that the premises are 
reasonably safe. This duty upon the part of a land owner 
is based upon his superior knowledge of conditions upon 
his premises. Where a dangerous condition is obvious, 
or is as well known to the invitee as to the owner of the 
premises, there is no obligation to give warning nor to 
take steps to remedy the dangerous condition. 
1Ye do not cite authorities for these principles at 
this point. The principles will be found reiterated time 
and again in the authorities hereinafter cited. 
As heretofore pointed out with particularity, the 
entranceway to the defendant's store was constructed 
of terrazzo, a building material in common use in this 
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locality for entranceways to comn1ercial buildings. It 
was at a slight slope, but had a grade considerably less 
than the average or nor1nal grade for entranceways to 
buildings in Salt Lake City and less than the standard 
:public sidewalk. The plaintiff was thoroughly familiar 
with this entranceway, having traversed it many times 
before. At the time she entered the building she ob-
served that the entrance,,ray was wet and she concluded 
that the water had been tracked in by other patrons of 
the store. She also was familiar with other terrazzo 
entranceways in the city of Salt Lake. She was as fully 
cognizant of the condition of the premises as was the 
defendant or any of its agents and servants. 
\Ve have been unable to discover any Utah cas'~ 
closely similar on its facts. However, there are numer-
ous cases from other jurisdictions. To cite and discuss 
all of them in this brief would serve only to unduly pro-
long it and to overburden the Court. We have selected 
for discussion only those cases which we considered 
would be most helpful to the Court in determining the 
case. 
In 4 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, page 1824, 
Sec. 798, it is said: 
''Floors of marble or hardwood are in their 
nature slipp,ery, but the use of such materials is 
not in itself negligence. The same is true of con-
crete floors.'' 
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And at page 1826 of the same authority it is said: 
"Water, slush and mud tracked in upon a 
floor by reason of weather conditions outside, 
although it renders the floor wet, dirty and slip-
pery, does not ordinarily create an actionable 
situation. A wet and sloppy condition of the 
floor may be necessarily incidental to the busi-
ness or activity in question.'' 
The cases supporting these principles are legion. 
Perhaps the leading case on this question is Mullen v. 
Sensenbrenner Mere. Co., (Mo.), 260 S.W. 982. In that 
case the plaintiff commenced an action for personal in-
juries sustained by her when she fell on the tile entrance 
of the defendant's mercantile store in the city of St. 
Louis. She alleged (similarly to the plaintiff in the case 
at bar), that the tile entrance was unusually slick, smooth 
and glassy and that it was at an unusually unsafe and 
dangerous angle or slope. She likewise alleged that the 
defendant failed to make such entrance safe for pedes-
trians by roughing the tiling or spreading sawdu8t 
thereon, or rplacing rubber mats thereon, or other ap-
parat~~ or material to prevent persons from sl~pping 
and falling. She also charged negligence for failure to 
give warning of the dangerous condition. 
The plaintiff in that case was also a woman of ad-
vanced years, being 64 years of age. In that ease the 
plaintiff had never been in the defendant's store before, 
but she had noticed the entrance as she entered the 
store and had seen that it was a tile floor and that it 
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had quite a slope to it. She had been in other stores 
which had tile floors and they were nothing new to her. 
As in the case at bar, the evidence at the trial 
showed that there were many entrances made of the 
same kind of tile as the entrance to the defendant '8 
store and that such entrances were sloping. 
In that case the defendant was permitted to prove 
by the testimony of its president that the entranceway 
had been built some years before and had been used by 
hundreds of people daily ever since its construction, and 
that there had never been any complaint of any person 
slipping or falling in said entrance before or after the 
plain tiff was injured. 
The similarity of the facts in that case to those in 
the case at bar will be readily apparent to the Court. 
In holding that the slope of the entranceway did 
not ·amount to negligence the Court said: 
''In this case there was a rise of but 5 inches 
in 5 feet in this entrance. It was not as danger-
ous as a step 6 inches high. Such entrances are 
usual in business buildings, as much or more so 
than steps. We therefore hold that the slope of 
said incline of itself was no evidence of negli-
gence.'' 
And in holding that the defendant was not negli-
gent for failure to give warning or for failure to put 
out rubber mats, the court stated as follows: 
''As to whether the tile was so slick as to be 
dangerous: Defendant's evidence is that the tile 
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floor was put down in 1915, and this accident hap-
pened four years afterward, and that in the 
meantime thousands of peo:ple must have passed 
over it before plaintiff was injured, and also 
after plaintiff was injured, up to the time of the 
trial, and that no other person was ever injured 
thereon by slipping or otherwise, although it was 
always in the same condition as when plaintiff 
was injured. Such evidence conclusively shows 
that said tile was not so slick, or said entrance 
so sloping, or the crack therein so large or of 
such character as not to be reasonably safe, with-
out rugs or sawdust or any other covering there-
on. * * * The proprietor in such cases is only re-
quired to exercise reasonable care to make the 
floor reasonably safe for invitees, or to give the 
invitee notice of dangers known to him and un-
known to the invitee. Main v. Lehman, supra, 
pp. 590-591, and cases there cited. In this case 
the plaintiff fully viewe·d the entrance as she 
went into the defendant's store. She saw that 
it was of tile, and saw the kind of tile it was, and 
could see and feel how smooth or slick it was. 
She saw that it was without rugs or covering, 
and noticed its slope. She was fully notified of 
the condition and character of the entrance and 
of all danger, if any, connected therewith when 
she entered defendant's building. She says she 
was familiar with sloping tile entrances, and that 
they were all right going U!P, but the danger was 
in walking down. Defendant knew of no condi-
tion or danger connected with said entrance not 
known or visible to plaintiff. It was high noon, 
and perfectly light. Under such circumstances 
defendant was not liable for plaintiff's injury in 
coming out of said building over such entrance, 
In the Main case, supra, after reviewing numer-
ous authorities in this state, we said, page 591: 
- I 
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'In the case at bar, there is no evidence that the 
defendant had previously know11 or regarded tl1e 
step as dangerous, or that he knew or cotdd have 
knozcn any more in regard to its characte-r as 
being dangerous or otlu:rwise than by seeing it 
and observing its location and surroundings, 
u·hich the plaintiff had an opportttnity to and did 
do at the time she entered the toilet.' 
''And on page 592 of 294 Mo. we said : 'No 
case is cited from this or any other jurisdiction, 
and we have been unable to find any, where the 
invitee had full knowledge and information im-
mediately before his or her injury of the step or 
other obstruction complained of, in which de-
fendant was held guilty of negligence or liable 
for the plaintiff's injury.' 
''We hold that there was no evidence of de-
fendant's negligence, and therefore the case 
should not have been submitted to the jury. 
"IV. Furthermore, while in the absence of 
notice or knowledge of an obstruction or defect 
in a street, a pedestrian may presume the way is 
clear, yet, after notice. of any such defect, he is 
guilty of contributory negligence if he shortly 
afterwards fails to look out for such defect in 
his pathway, and is injured thereby.'' (Italics 
ours.) 
The holding of the court in the above quoted case 
has been consistently followed by the Missouri courts. 
See: 
Vogt v. Wurmb, (Mo.) 300 S.W. 278. 
LOJppin v. St. Louis National League Base-
ball Club, (Mo. App.), 33 S.W. (2d) 1025. 
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Paubel v. Hitz, (Mo.) 96 S.W. (2d) 369. 
Reddy v. Jos. Oaravelli Inc., (Mo. App.) 102 
s.w. (2d) 734. 
Heidland v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., (Mo. 
App.) 110 S.W. (2d) 795. 
Beitch v. Central Terminal Co., (Mo. App) 
122 s.w. (2d) 94. 
Stoll v. First Nat'l. Bank of Indeypendence, 
(Mo.) 134 S.W. (2d) 97. 
Murray v. Ralph D'Oench Co., (Mo.) 147 
s.w. (2d) 623. 
Corley v. Kroger Grocer &; Baking Co., (Mo. 
App.) 189 S.W. (2d) 178. 
Schnall v. National Shirt Shops of Missouri 
(Mo.) 193 S.W. (2d) 605. 
The holding of the Supreme Court of Missouri has 
also been given sanction by the appellate courts of many 
other jurisdictions and its language has been oftimes 
quoted. See for example: 
Watkins v. Piggly Wiggly Bird Co., 31 Fed. 
(2d) 889. 
Bohannon v. Leonard- Fitzpatrick- Meuller 
Stores Co., Inc. (N.C.) 150 S.E. 356. 
Cornwell·v,. S. S. Kresge Co., (W.Va.,), 164 
S.E. 156. 
Herrick v. Breier, (Ida.) 82 P. (2d) 90. 
Thompson v. Y.M.C.A., (Nebr.) 241 N.W. 565. 
Russell Vr Liggett Drug Co., Inc., (Tex. Civ. 
App.), 153 S.W. (2d) 231. 
- I 
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Copelan v. Stanley Co. of America, (Pa.), 17 
Atl. (2d) 659. 
In the case of Vogt v~ lVunnb (Mo.), 300 S.\V. 278, 
the plaintiff fell on the steps at the entrance to the de-
fendant's store. The steps had been recently painted 
and "·ere covered by boards approximately lit," thick. 
The plaintiff had observed the condition of the ste:ps a8 
she entered the store, but upon leaving she slipped on 
one of the boards which becamB entangled in her legs 
and tripped her. A judgment of non-suit was affirmed 
by the Supreme Court, which said : 
"But in any event whatever danger inhered 
in their condition was perfectly obvious. There 
was no lurking peril; nothing touching the physi-. 
cal situation was hidden or concealed. What 
plaintiff saw in going up the steps and upon her 
return to come down them disclosed to her all 
the information which the proprietors of the 
store had touching both their condition and the 
care required to use them with safety," (Italics 
ours.) 
In the case of Lappin v. St. Louis Natl. League Base-
ball Club, 33 S.W. (2d) 1025, the plaintiff was injured 
when shB slipped on a concrete stairway as she was 
attempting to leave the grand stand. The plaintiff was 
a regular attendant at the baseball games, having at-
tended all of the home games· for three years prior to 
the date of the accident. On the date in question the 
game had been called on account of wet grounds. She 
was leaving the grand stand by the same exit which she 
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had always used, which consisted of some 7 or 8 con-
crete steps. There was water on one of the steps upon 
which she slipped and fell. 
The treasurer of the defendant corporation testi-
fied that in the 12 years he had been connected with the 
defendant club there had never been an accident at the 
place in question. An expert engineer testified that the 
steps had a slight slope which was of standard con-
struction; that every well constructed step in every 
building had the same slope and that the steps were 
designed in a way that any good architect would design 
them. 
The plaintiff complained that the defendant was 
negligent in maintaining the steps in an uneven condi-
tion so that they would retain and hold puddles of water; 
in failing to maintain a canopy or cover over the st~p.s; 
in failing to prevent the steps from becoming wet; in 
failing to remove water after a rain, and in permitting 
people to use the stairway while wet. The plaintiff also 
complained that no hand rails were provided. 
The case was submitted to the jury on the last men-
tioned allegation of negligence only and resulted in a 
verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. In reversing the 
judgment, the court said: 
"* * • [plaintiff] must have observed the 
absence of hand rails and with reference to any 
danger arising from the absence of such rails 
she was as completely advised as the defendant. 
* * * We hold therefore that the case should not 
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have been submitted to the jury because of the 
absence of hand rails. * * * '' 
The court quoted at son1e length frorn Mullen Vr 
Sensenbrerwer ~Jere Co., supra, and other cases, and 
then said: 
"Under the cases above cited, the defendant 
was not liable merely because the accident oc-
curred. It was not bound to make the stairway 
absolutely safe, but was charged only with the 
duty to use ordinary care to maintain it in a 
reasonably safe condition. It would be liable 
only if the plaintiff, using due care, was injured 
by an unsafe condition of the stairway known to 
it and not known to the plaintiff. Plaintiff had 
been a regular attendant upon the games for a 
long period and had used this stairway on such 
occasions whether it was raining or not, so she 
was as fully advised of the conditions as was the 
defendant. Whatever danger attended the use of 
the stairway wet with rain which had fallen Uip!On 
it was as obvious to her as it was to the defendant. 
In this case, as in the Main case supra, there ·is 
no evidence that defendant had previously known 
of any dangerous condition of the stairway; in 
fact, according to the testimony of a witness 
who was in a position to know, in the 12 years of 
his connection with the Park there had been no 
previous accident at this stairway." (Italics 
ours.) 
In the case of Beitch v. Central Terminal Co., 122 
S.W. (2d) 94, the plaintiff was injured when he slipped 
and fell as he was leaving the waiting room of the de-
fendant's building. The plaintiff had patronized a res-
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taurant in the defendant's building and he had observed, 
when he entered the building, that the floor in the de-
fendant's waiting room was wet for about 6 feet inside 
the door, water having been tracked in from the outside. 
He again observed this condition as he was leaving. The 
plaintiff sued the defendant in negligence for allowing 
water to accumulate on the floor, for failure to provide 
mats and failure to take other precautions for the health 
and safety of the patrons. Said the court: 
"* * * [plaintiff] knew that the floor was 
W'et and whatever danger existed was obvious; 
plaintiff had all the information which the de-
fendant could have had; defendant had no super-
ior knowledge of the perilous condition of the 
floor and since, under the Missouri cases cited 
supra, superior knowledge on the part of the de-
fendant is held essential to create liability on its 
part to the plaintiff as an invitee, plaintiff may 
not recover." (Italics added.) 
In Cornwell v. 8. 8. Kresge Co., 164 S.E. 156, plain-
tiff fell and injured herself as she was leaving the de-
fendant's store after having made a purchase there. She 
had observed, as she entered the store, that the floor at 
and near the entrance was wet from water carried in 
by other shoppers and she realized that it was slippery. 
A directed verdict for the defendant was affirmed, the 
court saying: 
''An invitee who uses a damp floor with 
knowledge of its condition assumes any risk in-
cidental thereto.'' 
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In Paubel v. Hitz, ("Jfo.) 96 S.\Y. (2d) 369, a post-
man was injured when he slipped and fell from a run-
way leading to the defendant's place of business. The 
plaintiff \Yas thoroughly familiar with the runway, hav-
ing traversed it many times before. It was similar to 
runways used by other persons engaged in the same 
business in the same vicinity. At the time of the acci-
dent the runway was covered with manure and chicken 
filth, which was not an unusual condition. A judgment 
for the plaintiff was reversed, the court saying: 
''According to plaintiff's testimony, the main-
tenance and use of the runway at defendant's 
place of business was common to the commission 
houses in the vicinity. No hidden, lurking or 
secret peril is involved. Whatever danger existed 
was not only obvious, but actually known and ap-
preciated by plaintiff. He possessed all the in-
formation concerning the physical condition of 
the runway possessed by defendant or his em-
ployees and knew of and appreciated the care 
required to use the runway. Had he been warned 
of the sliAppery condition of the runway, no 
greater information would have been imparted to 
him than that which he admittedly possessed.'' 
(Italics added.) 
In the case of Thompson v. Y.M.C . .A., (Neb.) 241 
N.W. 565 the plaintiff injured herself when she slipped· 
on the front steps to the defendant's building as she was 
leaving. She had entered the building over the s·ame 
steps about five minutes prior to the accident. The steps 
were somewhat worn and one of them was wet. In af-
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firming a judgment of non-suit, the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska said: 
''The authorities generally hold that the risks 
which are obvious to a person are assumed by 
her where, as in the present case, the relation 
was that of owner and invitee or :patron." 
In the case of Russell v. Liggett Drug Co .. , Inc., 153 
S.W. (2d) 231, the plaintiff's intestate slipped and sus-
tained fatal injuries on a floor which had been waxed 
and polished. She had been over the floor a short time 
p,rior to the accident. The court said: 
''Whatever may have been the condition of 
the floor, it was not concealed, but obvious and 
plainly to be observed by the injured lady through 
walking thereon. From this perspective it is diffi-
cult to escape the conclusion of non-liability for 
injuries from dangers which are manifest and 
were as well known to the injured party as to 
the· defendant." (Italics ours.) 
The Court also quoted with approval from Ft. Worth 
db D. C. R. Co. v. Hambright, {Tex. Civ. App.), 130 S.W. 
(2d) 436, 439: 
''The only conditions under which such an 
owner. is liable to those whom he invites upon 
his premises are when dangerous and unsafe 
instrumentalities or conditions exist, and are 
known to him and not known to such invited 
persons, and they are injured by such instrumen-
talities or conditions. It follows that if a person 
is injured under such circumstances when the 
instrumentality or condition by which he is in-
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is to the owner of the premises, no liability exists 
for such injury and the law will allow him no 
recovery therefor." 
In Corley V.- !(roger Grocer & Baking C01npany, 189 
S."\V. (2d) 178, the plaintiff fell on a step at the entrance 
to defendant's store. The step was of iron which was 
worn smooth. It had been snowing and the step was 
wet from accumulated snow. Plaintiff had been over 
the step many times before. The case was submitted to 
the jury on two grounds of negligence: (a) failure to 
correct the dangerous condition of the step; and (b) 
failure to give· warning of the dangerous condition. 
A verdict and judgment for the plaintiff were re-
versed, the court saying: 
"The testimony of plaintiff shows that at the 
time of the ·occurrence it was snowing slightly 
and the wind was blowing the snow about. The 
step in question was outside step where snow-
flakes would necessarily fall under the conditions 
testified to. In view of this evidence we cannot 
say that a failure to remove immediately every 
snowflake as it fell, or with a blow torch or by 
some other means to dry the moisture created 
by the film of snow as it fell, could reasonably 
be held to be a breach of duty which defendant 
owed to plaintiff as an invitee. To so require 
would be to demand an exercise of such extra-
ordinary care as would be unreasonable. We are 
satisfied that no case for the jury was made under 
the assignment of negligence in question. * * * 
'' * * * ..A. defendant storekeeper or land owner 
is not liable to his business invitee for injuries 
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resulting from an open obvious condition, just as 
well known to the invitee as it is to the owner. * * * 
''Everyone knows that snow is slick and every-
one knows that any worn surface is rendered 
especially slick by the p1resence thereon of mois-
ture. Due care did not require defendant to warn 
plaintiff of these simple facts. She was bound to. 
know them .. To require defendant to do so would 
be to place upon it an unreasonable burden, a duty 
to exercise a higher degree of care than the law 
and common sense should require." (Italics add-
ed.) 
The case of Schnoll v. National Shirt Shops of Mis-
souri, (Mo.), 193 S.W. (2d) 605, is remarkably similar 
on its facts to the case at bar. The defendant store in 
that case had an entranceway very similar to that of 
the Walgreen Drug Company. The floor was of terrazzo. 
However, there was on the floor some brass lettering. 
The brass was not corrugated and the brass letters pro-
truded slightly above the level of the terrazzo floorway. 
There, as here, the plaintiff was wearing Cuban Heels, 
but of rubber rather than of leather. Likewise, at the 
time she slipped and fell at the entranceway it was 
raining and it had been raining for sometime iprior 
thereto. As in the case at bar, the plaintiff alleged that 
the floor was slippery when wet and that the defendant 
was negligent in failing to put out a rubber mat, and 
in failing to warn of the dangerous condition. Also 
similar to the present case, the entranceway had a slight 
incline or slope. Further paralleling the facts in the 
case at bar, the evidence showed that prior to the day 
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of the accident the defendant had custmnarily had a 
rubber mat on the entranreway on rainy days. The evi-
dence there as here, showed that terrazzo was in common 
use for entranceways to stores in the locality. 
A verdict and judgment for the plaintiff were re-
versed, the Court saying: 
"There is no liability of defendant for injuries 
from dangers that are obvious or as well known 
to plaintiff as to defendant. * * * 
"It is commonly known that a smooth, highly 
polished surface is slippery when wet. Under the 
circumstances a person of ordinary prudence 
would have appreciated the slippery condition of 
wet brass lettering so patently disclosed; although 
plaintiff did not according to the evidence. In this 
connection we are treating more directly with the 
legal duty or basis of liability of defendant than 
with a question of contributory negligence. De-
fendant, who is not subject to liability for injuries 
resulting from dangers that were obvious, should 
not be obliged to antic~pate that its patrons, in the 
exercise of ordinary care, would fail to appreciate 
dangers generally known to be inherent in condi-
tions that were obvious. * * • 
''Defendant was not required to have its prem-
ises absolutely safe-defendant was not an insurer 
of its patrons' safety." (Italics added.) 
In the case of Copelan v. Stanley Co. of America, 
(Pa.), 17 Atl. (2d) 659, the plaintiff slipped on a ter-
razzo step to a theatre. The step was somewhat worn. 
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In reversing the verdict and judgment for the plaintiff 
the Court said: 
''The charge of negligence in this case has 
not been sustained. The material of which the 
step was constructed was reasonably suitable for 
the purpose and was one in common use.'' 
Another leading case on this same question which 
has found extensive support from the Courts of other 
jurisdictions, is the case of 8. 8. Kresge Co. v. Fader, 
116 0. St. 718, 158 N.E. 174. The facts of that case are 
similar to those in the case at bar. The plaintiff slipped 
at the entranceway to the defendant's store. It w:1s 
raining at the time and as in the instant case, other 
patrons of the store had tracked water into the store. 
Some rain had also been blown in when the door was 
open. There, as here, the plaintiff charged that the de-
fendant was negligent in failing to put out a rubber 
mat and in failing to warn customers of the wet floor. In 
holding the defendant not liable, the Supreme Court of 
Ohio said: 
"It is a fact known to all that many stores 
in all branches of trade have an inside door or 
passageway into the store, usually in the middle 
of the front. On each side of this passageway 
then extends back ten or twelve feet or more to 
the entrance door to the store. The passage 
usually has a slight slope from the door to the 
sidewalk, at which line there is no door. This 
slope is to carry away the rain that may blow 
into the passageway. The passageway is in fact 
practically a :part of the sidewalk, but at the 
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same tinw it is within the front line of the store, 
and under control of the store. TVo1rld any one 
contend that, if a person walked into such passage-
tray tchen it u·as raining, and there slipped and 
fell, he cottld recover damages because there 
teas moisture on .the floor of tl1c passageway? 
J.llanifestly not. EYerybody knmvs that, when 
people are entering any building when it is rain-
ing, they will carry some moisture on their feet, 
which will render the floor near the door on the 
inside damp to some extent, and every one knows 
that a damp floor is likely to be a little more 
slippery than a dry floor. In this instance Mrs. 
Fader knew that her own shoes were wet when 
she went in there out of the rain storm, and after 
walking on the west sidewalk. * * * 
"01\"'llers or lessees of stores, office buildings, 
banks, hotels, theaters, or other buildings where 
the public is invited to come on business or pleas-
ure, are not insurers against all forms of accidents 
that may happen to any who come. Everybody 
knows that the hallways between the outside doors 
of such buildings and the elevators or business 
counters inside the building during a continued 
rain storm are tracked all over by the wet feet 
of people coming from the wet sidewalks, and are 
thereby rendered more slippery than they other-
wise would be. The same thing is true in the hall-
ways of all postoffices. It is not the duty of per-
sons in control of such buildings to keep a large 
force of mappers to mop up the rain as fast as it 
falls or blows in, or is carried in by wet feet or 
clothing or umbrellas, for several very good rea-
sons, all so obvious that it is wholly unnecessary 
to mention them here in detail, 
It should be borne in mind that this accident 
did not happen, in some dark walkway in the store 
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where the shopper found it necessary to go. It 
occurred in broad daylight, and there is no pre-
tense that there was anything · to prevent any 
shopper from seeing and knowing precisely what 
the conditions were. 
"Not every accident that occurs gives rise to 
a cause of action upon which the party injured 
may recover damages from some one. Thousands 
of accidents occur every day for which no one is 
liable in damages, and often no one is to blame, 
not even the ones who are injured. The character 
or extent of an injury has no bearing upon the 
question of the liability therefor; neither has the 
wealth nor the poverty of either party to such a 
litigation anything to do with the question of 
liability for the accident. 
''There is no evidence in this case tending to 
prove, much less proving, that the Kresge Com-
pany was guilty of negligence in any particular 
as charged by Mrs. Fader in her vetition. The 
trial court should have granted the motions of 
counsel for the Kresge Company for a directed 
verdict in its favor. Failing in this, the Court of 
Appeals should have reversed the judgment of 
the trial court and entered final judgment for 
the Kresge Company. 
''The judgments of both courts will be re-
versed and final judgment entered here in favor 
o:f the plaintiff in error." (Italics added.) 
A few of the many cases which have cited or quoted 
from the above quoted case, with approval, are as fol-
lows: 
Picman v. Higbee Co., (0. App.), 6 N.E. 
(2d) 21. 
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Dahnke l'. HHnt, (0. App.), 8 N.E. (2d) 838. 
Plotner v. Gt. Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., (0. App.), 
18 N.E. (2d) 409. 
Englehardt v. Phillips, (0. St.), :.?3 N.E. (2d) 
829. 
Krans v. W. T. Grant Co., (0. App.), 82 N.E. 
(2d) 544. 
Sears, Roeb~t.ek &; Co. v. Johnson, 91 Fed. 
(2d) 332. 
Murray v. Bedell Co. of Chicago, 256 Ill. App. 
247. 
Parsons v. H. L. Green Co. Inc., (Ia.), 10 
N.W. (2d) 40. 
Lawson v. D. H. Holmes Co. Ltd., (La.), 200 
So. 163. 
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Lamberson, 144 
Fed. (2d) 97. 
Lander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., (Me.), 44 
Atl. (2d) 886. 
Bersch v .. Holton St. State Bank, (Wis.) 19 
N.W. (2d) 175. 
Shumaker v. Charada Investment Co., 
(Wash.), 49 P. (2d) 44. 
Knopp v. Kemp & Hebert, (Wash.), 74 P. · 
(2d) 924. 
In Plotner v. Gt. Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 18 N.E. (2d) 
409, the plaintiff slipped on an oil spot in defendant's 
parking lot. She was familiar with the lot, having used 
it for 7 years prior to the accident and she knew that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
there was frequently oil on the lot. In reversing a judg-
ment for the ;plaintiff, the court said: 
"The appellant was not required continually 
to place a guard or employee to warn parking 
customers of that which was as 1plainly visible 
to the one as to the other. In the instant case 
the evidence warranted the conclusion that Mrs. 
Plotner assumed the risk of the plainly evident 
condition of which she complains. It was broad 
daylight and, according to her own story, she 
knew the recurring condition of the parking space 
from oil which fell from the cars continually 
parked there. How long the particular oil spot 
had existed no one knows, nor from what auto-
mobile it fell; but this much is known, the oil was 
not there by any act of appellant and the parking 
space had been washed and scrubbed on the 
morning of the day that Mrs. Plotner was injured 
at 5 :30 in the afternoon.'' 
In Englehardt v. Phillips, 23 N.E. (2d) 829, the 
court said: 
''The specific question here involved is whether 
the defendant set up an unreasonable risk as to 
the plaintiff by maintaining a diving tower, the 
platform of which was slippery when wet. Similar 
questions have frequently been before the courts 
involving the risks incident to the use of areas 
and surfaces upon which persons are invited to go 
while such areas or surfaces are in a slippery 
condition,' because of the presence of rain or 
other natural forms of moisture. These cases 
are distinguishable from others in which the 
negligence charged relates to some extraneous 
substance which has been placed upon or allowed 
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to accumulate upon commercial areas frequented 
by pedestrians, causing such area to become 
slippery and dangerous. * * * 
Because of the impracticability of avoiding the 
presence of moisture on such commercial surfaces 
and areas as commonly used and maintained, 
especially when located out of doors or within the 
·entrances of building structures, the law generally 
declines to fix liability against those creating or 
maintaining such surfaces or areas in favor of 
those u'lw slip and fall thereon." (Italics ours.) 
In the case of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Johnson, 91 
Fed. (2d) 332, the plaintiff slipped on a wet floor where 
water had been tracked in from the outside by other 
patrons of the store. In denying the recovery the court 
said: 
"If what was shown in this case was sufficient 
to permit recovery it would require store owners 
to have a mopper stationed at the doors on rainy 
days for the sole purpose of mopping up after 
every customer entering or leaving the premises. 
Every store owner would be required to be an 
insurer against such accidents to public invitees 
who came in on rainy days with wet shoes." 
The facts of Murray v~ Bedell Co. of Chicago, 256 
Ill. App. 247, are very similar to those in the case at bar. 
In denying recovery, the court said: 
"In the case at bar the plaintiff was as well 
apprised of the condition existing in the vestibule 
as the defendant and should be held to as high 
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a degree of care for her own safety as would be 
required of the defendant.'' 
The Supreme Court of Iowa used the following 
language in denying recovery in another case similar to 
the case at bar : 
"We cannot say that a failure to follow and 
remove immediately every deposit of snow that 
is brought into a building can reasonably be held 
to be a breach of duty which the inviter owes to 
an invitee and constitutes negligence. Such is 
not the holding of the courts where this question 
has arisen. To so require would demand an exer-
cise of such extraordinary care as to be un-
reasonable. 
''Cases cited by defendant sustain this view 
and follow the general rule as to situations such 
as are here shown to have existed, temporary in 
character and produced by agencies over which 
the inviter has no control." Parsons v. H. L. 
Green Co. Inc., (Ia.), 10 N. W. (2d) 40. 
In Lawson v. D. H. Holmes Co. Ltd., (La.), 200 So. 
163, the plaintiffs' intestate sustained fatal injuries in 
a fall at the entrance to defendant's store. The entranre 
consisted of a step covered with scored cast-iron plate 
and a platform of tile bordered with glazed tile. The 
slope of the platform was about 4% and the slope of 
the iron tread was about 8%. At the time of the acci-
dent the entrance was wet from rain. An expert archi-
tect testified that the passageway was not properly 
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constructed, but admitted that the type of construcion 
was not unusual in that locality, though not of the most 
modern design. The iron tread was quite badly worn. 
Defendant's evidence showed that the entrance had 
been in use many years prior to the accident; that thous-
ands of people walked over it daily and there had never 
been a complaint with respect to its condition and no 
accident ever had occurred there before. The trial court 
ordered the complaint dismissed and the judgment was 
affirmed. The court said : 
'' * "'• we have no hesitancy in concluding that 
the district judge was correct in holding that the 
defendant was without fault and therefore is not 
responsible for the unfortunate accident. The 
well established jurisprudence of this state with 
respect to the duty owed by a storekeeper to his 
rp·atrons is that he is not an insurer of their safety. 
He need not keep his place and passageways in 
perfect condition, but must exercise only ordinary 
care and prudence to keep them in reasonably 
safe condition for his customers. * * * 
"The defendant's testimony showed that thou-
sands of people walk over this slab each day; 
that they have been doing so for many years; 
that there have been no complaints and no other 
accident has ever occurred. This to our minds is 
a strong circumstance which must be considered 
by us in determining the condition of the step. 
* * * Then, too, it is shown that there is nothing 
uncommon or exceptional about the use of an 
iron slab over a step to protect it and that the 
steps of many buildings situated in New Orleans 
are provided with similar coveoring. 
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''The accident occurred in broad daylight and 
is one which can and does frequently happen 
without the slightest fault on the part of anyone. 
The fact that it had been raining and that the 
vestibule was wet undoubtedly caused the passage-
way to be slippery, but this of itself cannot be 
plausibly advanced by plaintiffs as an argument 
to hold the defendant liable for their mother's 
death. On the contrary, Mrs. Lawson knew that 
it was raining and she is to be charged with 
knowledge of the fact that one is apt to slip 
upon any wet surface. On this point we find our-
selves in absolute accord with the views expressed 
by the Supreme Court of Ohio in S. S. Kresge 
Co. v. Fader * * * '' Lengthy quotation from 
Kresge case omitted. (Italics ours.) 
In Lander v. Sears Roebuck & Co., (Me.) 44 Atl. 
(2d) 886, the plaintiff slipped on a wet spot in defend-
ant's store which was caused by customers tracking in 
rain water from the outside. A directed verdict for the 
defendant was affirmed, the court saying: 
''This case * * * present the single issue 
whether a storekeeper is negligent in permitting 
customers to enter a store having a floor which 
becomes slippery when weather conditions are 
such that water or moisture will be tracked in 
upon their footwear without 1protecting them from 
the hazard of slipping by the use of mats or 
other rna terials under such circumstances or by 
keeping the floor dry through mopping. A wet 
floor inevitably results when rain or snow is 
falling or the ground outside is covered with 
melting snow. * • • 
''There is no evidence that the defendant knew 
or should ~ave known that the condition of its 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
floor was hazardous, or that any foreign sub-
stances other than that which every customer 
entering, including the plaintiff, was tracking in, 
increased the hazard caused by moisture alone. 
There is no evidence that the floor was more 
slippery than it would have been if surfaced 
·with any material standard for use as the floor-
ing in a mercantile establishment in the locality. 
* * * The defendant was doing business on a 
day when the conditions of nature outside and 
the entry of customers into its store necessarily 
carried moisture on to the floor. It cannot be 
said on the evidence contained in the record that 
its agents or servants were not exercising reason-
able care to guard its customers against any risk 
which was known to them or should have been 
foreseen by them. It was proper to direct a 
verdict for the defendant." 
In Shumaker v. Charada Inv. Co., 49 P. (2d) 44, 
the plaintiff was injured when she slipped on the wet 
cement floor of defendant's market. She had visited the 
market on many prior occasions and the evidence estab-
lished that the floor of the market was frequently wet. 
In holding defendant not liable, the Supreme Court of 
Washington said : 
"We are of the op1n1on that no primary 
negligence was in this case proven against ap-
pellant. Assuming that ap}}·ellant knew that 
water was frequently splashed upon the cement 
floors of the market, and that these floors were 
often damp or even wet, it cannot be held that 
a wet cement floor constitutes such a dangerous 
condition as to hold the owner maintaining the 
same responsible as for negligence to one who 
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slipped thereon. A wet cement surface ~oes not 
create a condition dangerous to pedestnans. It 
is a most common condition, and one readily 
noticed by the most casual glance.'' 
See also Hogan v. Metro1politan Bldg. Co., et al. 
(Wash.) 206 P. 959. 
Another case of striking similarity to the case at 
bar is J(nopp v. J(emp & Hebert, (Wash.) 74 P. (2d) 
924. The facts of that case, as stated in the opinion of 
the Court, are as follows: 
'' • • * The entrance door of the store on the 
Main A venue side is set back from the sidewalk 
about fifteen feet, and the strip of floor between 
the front wall of the store and the sidewalk is 
used as an arcade for the display of goods in 
glass enclosed areas, so arranged as to leave 
three open passages for entrance to the arcade 
area and the entrance door. The floor of the 
arcade is terrazzo, a composition mainly of 
cement and marble chips. It slopes slightly from 
the entrance door to the sidewalk, but so slightly 
that we think that fact of little or no importance. 
The sidewalk in front of the store is of the ordi-
nary, familiar cement mixture. Along the inside 
of the sidewalk where it joins the terrazzo, row!i' 
of small blocks of glass about two inches square 
:are set in the cement, a type of construction with 
which everyone is familiar. * • * 
''It is alleged that the terrazzo floor is very 
smoo~h and _becomes exceedingly slippery when 
wet, Is dark In color, and, when wet and tracked 
oye~ by _people entering the store, becomes so 
Similar In appearance to the cement sidewalk 
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that the ordinary person entering the arcade 
would not observe that he was passing from one 
type of floor to another, and for this reason the 
place presented a pitfall or trap to persons using 
the entrance in the manner for which it was 
designed and intended. * * • '' 
With respect to the condition of the floor, an archi-
tect testified as follows: 
'' 'This floor has an exceedingly smooth sur~ 
face and would be suitable for inside floors, I 
would say, in my opinion it is too smooth a sur-
face to be used for ramps or too smooth to be 
used for ramps or outside terrazzo work. Accord-
ing to good practice for designing or constructing 
all terrazzo floors for exterior, we add an anti-slip 
mixture to the terrazzo. And for floors of this 
type it required an added mixture of anti-slip 
material or abrasive such as carborundum or 
alundum in the proportions of about two hundred 
pounds of this material to three hundred pounds 
of marble chips.' 
"Mr. Rasque further testified that he examined 
the floor by looking at it, feeling of it, and rubbing 
his feet over it, but that he had made no analysis 
to determine the proportion of abrasive material 
in its construction; that the adjoining sidewalk 
was of a float finish cement, not very slippery; 
and that, although the glass insets would be 
slippery when wet, the intervening strips of 
cement between the glass blocks would tend to 
prevent sl1pping.'' 
It appeared that plaintiff fell 1n the entranceway 
when it was wet from having water tracked in over it. 
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Plaintiff was thoroughly familiar with the entranceway, 
having traversed it many times before. 
On these facts the Court directed a verdict for the 
defendant which was affirmed on appeal. The court 
quoted at length from S. S. Kresge Co. v. Fader, supra, 
and concluded as follows: 
"Walking, although it becomes automatic by 
long practice and use, is, after all, a highly co~­
plicated process. The body balance is maintained 
by the co-ordination of many muscles, and their 
operation is controlled by an intricate system of 
motor nerves, the failure of any of which for a 
split second, on account of advancing age or for 
some other reason, may cause a fall. It is common 
knowledge that people fall on the best of sidewalks 
and floors. A fall, therefore, does not, of itself, 
tend to prove that the surface over which one is 
walking is dangerously unfit for the purpose. 
''Appellant contends, however, that cases of 
the type hereinbefore cited do not fully cover the 
circumstances of the case at bar. It is argued 
thai the situation presented a trap for the unwary, 
since the terrazzo surface was more slippery 
than the adjoining sidewalk, and the junction of 
the two surfaces was obscured by slush or muddy 
water so that one entering the store could not 
determine where the sidewalk ended and the 
terrazzo began. But it would seem that one 
entering the store could not help but see the broad 
terrazzo surface of the arcade and would natural-
ly conclude that it extended to the sidewalk line. 
At all events, the appellant would naturally pro-
ceed very carefully in passing over the wet, glass-
studded sidewalk. She testified that she did so, 
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and what further precaution could or would she 
have taken had she noticed the exact line of 
demarcation between the sidewalk and the ter-
razzo~ We see nothing in the circumstances of 
the case to bring it within the rule of such cases 
as Short v. Spokane, 41 Wash. :257, 83 P. 183, and 
Tyler Y. 'Yoolworth Co., supra.'' 
The same principles have also been followed by the 
California Courts. In Mautino v. Sutter Hospital Ass'n., 
(Cal. App.), 285 P. 369, the plaintiff, a nurse, slipped 
and fell on a waxed and polished floor in a room of the 
hospital. She was familiar with the room, having been 
in it before, and she had observed, prior to the accident, 
that the floor ·was slippery. A judgment for the plaintiff 
was reversed, the court quoting from 20 RrC.L. pages 
55-57 as follows : 
'' * * * The owner is not an insurer of such 
persons, even when he has invited them to enter. 
Nor is there any presumption of negligence on 
the part of an owner or occupier merely upon a 
showing that an injury has been sustained by 
one while rightfully upon the premises. The true 
ground of liability is the ~roprietor 's superior 
knowledge of the perilous instrumentality and 
the danger therefrom to persons going upon the 
property. It is when the perilous instrumentality 
is known to the owner or occupant and not to 
the person injured that a recovery is permitted. 
* * * There is no liability for injuries from 
dangers that are obvious or as well known to 
the person injured as to the owner or occupant." 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, the 
above cited case was affirmed and the opinion of the 
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Court of Appeals adopted as the opinion of the Supreme 
Court. Mautino v. Sutter Hospital Ass'n., (Cal.) 296 P. 
78. 
The principles laid down in those cases were re-
affirmed in the case of Neil v. Bank of America National 
Trust & Savings Ass'n., (Cal. App.), 104 P. (2d) 107. 
In that case a bank customer slipped on wet linoleum 
which had been made wet by customers tracking in mud 
and rain water from the outside. In reversing a judg·-
ment for the plaintiff, the court made the following 
statement: 
''In the case of Crawford v. Pacific States 
S. & L. Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d 448, 449, 71 P. 2d 
333, it was stated, quoting from Touhy v. Owl 
Drug Co., 6 Cal. App. 2d 64, 66, 44 P. 2d 405: 
'' 'The proprietor of buildings who directly 
or by implication invites others to go therein 
owes to such persons who thus enter a duty to 
have his premises in a reasonably safe condition, 
and to give warning of latent or concealed perils. 
He is not an insurer of such persons, nor does 
the mere occurrence of injury on such premises 
to such invitee create any presumption of negli-
gence on the part of the proprietor. His respon-
sibility is not absolute; he is only required to 
use ordinary care for the safety of the persons 
he invites to come upon the premises. The true 
ground of liability rests on the proprietor's 
superior knowledge of the perilous instrumental-
ity and the danger therefrom to invitees, over 
that of the invitee. Where such danger is obvi-
ous, or is as well known to the injured invitee as 
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to the owner or occupant, there is no liability.' 
[Citing numerous cases.] 
"The general rule is stated in 25 Corpus 
Juris, 837, Sec. 245 : 'In order to impose lia-
bility for injury to an invitee by reason of the 
dangerous condition of the premises the condi-
tions must have been known to the owner or 
occupant or have existed for such time that it 
was the duty of the owner or occupant to know 
of it.' Citing the California case, Shanley v. 
American Olive Co., 185 Cal. 552, 197 P. 793." 
Another case closely similar on its facts to the case 
at bar is Cestario v. Pennsylvania .Greyhound Lines, Inc., 
49 F. Supp. 1004 (1943). In that case it appeared that 
plaintiff, a prospective passenger, on one of defendant's 
busses, slipped and fell on a terrazzo floor of the lobby 
of defendant's bus station. The lobby floor was level 
with and open to the sidewalk. It was covered to the line 
of the sidewalk by an upper floor of the building. At 
the time of her arrival at the station it was drizzling, 
and it had been raining. Although plaintiff noticed that 
the sidewalk was wet, she did not notice that the lobby 
floor was in the same condition. As she entered she 
slipped and fell on a spot which, after she had fallen, 
she noticed was wet. At the time an iron mesh rug was 
on the floor in front of a door, but at the point of plain-
tiff's entrance no rug or abrasive substance was upon 
the floor. There was evidence that the floor would be 
slippery when wet. Defendant moved for a judgment 
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for it notwithstanding the verdict, which motion was 
allowed, the court saying : 
"In our judgment the maintenance of a ter-
razzo floor in a lobby, such as is shown in the in-
stant case and which is open to the entry of rain 
under certain conditions, without mats or sand 
when wet does not constitute negligence; and it is 
the duty of one entering upon such a lobby to 
observe and care for conditions following the 
entry of rain upon it." 
In the case of Bridgeford v_ Stewart Dry Goods Co., 
191 Ky. 557, 231 S.W. 22, plaintiff sli•prped and fell on 
a wet floor in the basement of defendant's store. The 
wetness was caused ~y an unusual rain storm. The plain-
tiff had observed that the floor was wet. She alleged 
negligence against the defendant in that the floor was 
slick and slippery and that the defendant failed to post 
warning notices and barricades. The Court affirmed a 
directed verdict for the defendant, saying: 
"Hence she [plaintiff] knew of the very con-
dition which she claims rendered the floor unsafe 
and her accident was not the result of defend-
ant's failure to give her notice or warning, even 
if it be conceded that ordinary care required 
notice that an ordinary wood floor in a well 
lighted room was moist or damp, which is at 
least doubtful. • * • Certain it is that the mere 
fact the floor was moist or damp did not render 
it so dangerous as to require of defendant in 
the exercise of ordinary care for the safety of 
its customers that it should place barricades 
across the entrance of the basement and prevent 
its use altogether until the floor was entirely 
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dried out. We are inclined to the op1n10n that 
proof simply that an ordinary wood floor in a 
well lighted room is moist or damp is no evidence 
that it is not in a reasonably safe condition for 
use, but if mistaken in that we are quite sure 
that one who uses such a floor with full knowledge 
of its condition assumes any and all risks in-
cident to its use." 
The New York courts have followed the principles 
laid down by the above cited cases. See Miller v. Gimbel 
Bros. Inc., 262 N.Y. 107, 186 N.E. 410, and Antenen v. 
New York Telephone Co., (N.Y.), 2 N.E. (2d) 693. 
We can close our argument on this point in no better 
way than by a reference to the recent case of Dudley v, 
Montgomery Ward & Co., (Wyo.), 192 P. (2d) 617. The 
facts of that case are quite similar to those in the case 
at bar. The plaintiff was injured when she slipped on a 
wet spot in the defendant's store. There was snow and 
slush on the sidewalks, some of which had been tracked 
into defendant's store by other patrons. The plaintiff 
was walking her usual gait, or perhaps just a little fast, 
when she entered the store. Her shoes were wet. At the 
time of the accident the .plaintiff was 58 years old. 
A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed. The 
opinion of the Court is lengthy and carefully reviews 
many of the cases cited in this brief and also many 
others treating the same question. After a careful re-
view of the authorities, the court said: 
"• "' * we cannot perceive that if it be claimed 
that plaintiff slipped as a result of the combina-
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tion of her wet shoes and the slush and water 
tracked in by the store's customers, there could 
be predicated thereon any failure on defendant's 
part to perform a duty which it owed to plain-
tiff. Nor could a jury [Jvroperly find the defendant 
guilty of negligence in that respect. It cannot be 
the law that under the temporary weather condi-
tions prevalent on September 27, 1945, a store-
keeper must at his peril keep his floors absolutely 
dry or maintain a force of mappers to follow 
every customer who enters the store. That would 
be wnreasonable and even impossible for most 
store owners. It would seem decidedly significant 
in the case before us that although she saw that 
the defendant's store floor inside the door used 
by the plaintiff was slippery with slush and water, 
she walked 'a little fast' through it and fell.'' 
(Italics added.) 
In summary, it may be observed that in most of the 
cases above cited, the facts were stronger for the plain-
tiff than in the case at bar. In many of the cases the 
slope of the entranceway was greater than in the in-
stant case. In some of the cases there was expert testi-
mony that the entranceway was not of sound construc-
tion, whereas in the instant case, the expert testimony 
is to the effect that the construction employed was the 
safest type known to the industry. In some of the above 
cases the plaintiff had never been on the premises be-
fore, whereas here the plaintiff had traversed the same 
entranceway many times before. .Also in some of the 
above cases there was a question of improper lighting; 
there is no such question here. Further, in many of 
these cases it appeared that plaintiff was wearing rub-
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hers, or rubber-heeled shoes, whereas here, the plaintiff 
was wearing leather heeled shoes, which were worn on 
the outside, and on which the nails were worn, forming 
a hard, smooth surface. 
We also think that it is of significance that in nearly 
all of these cases, the ~plaintiff was a woman, generally 
of advanced years. Assumedly, she would be wearing 
"built-up heels." A woman wearing high heels should 
have some duty to walk with care for her own safety, 
particularly when traversing a wet, smooth surface. And 
the Courts have uniformly denied recovery where the 
plaintiff, having observed and being fully cognizant oi 
the situation, has fallen on an entranceway made wet 
and slick by rain; or by water being tracked in by 
other store patrons. As has been pointed out so well, 
in the opinions of many of the Courts, to hold the store-
keeper liable under such circumstances would be to hold 
him to an insurer's liability, and to cast upon him a 
burden of care almost impossible to discharge. 
The evidence in this case conclusively establishes 
that the entranceway was constructed in accordance with 
the highest standards of safety known to the construc-
tion industry. Any hazard which may have temporarily 
existed at the time of plaintiff's accident, due to the 
wetness of the floor caused by rainwater being tracked 
in by other patrons, was open and obvious, and was 
recognized by the plaintiff. There was no duty on the 
part of the defendant to give warning of such condi-
tion, or to put out rubber mats. To permit this judg-
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ment to stand, would cast upon storekeepers in general 
an impossible burden of care. The judgment should be 
reversed with directions to enter a judgment in favor 
of defendant, no cause of action. 
POINT II. THE VERDICT IS INCONSISTENT AND 
CONTRARY TO THE INSTRUCTIONS 
OF THE COURT AND IS 
AGAINST LAW. 
The negligence relied upon by the plaintiff as 
grounds of recovery against the defendants as stated 
in paragraph 5 of plaintiff's amended complaint (R. 34) 
is as follows: 
(a) That the entranceway was constructed with a 
slight grade and of a material which was smooth and 
polished and when wet became slick and slippery. 
(b) That the defendants failed to give appropriate 
warning to the ;plaintiff of the dangerous condition and 
failed to cover the entranceway with mats or with other 
material to make it safe. 
With respect to the dangerous construction of the 
entranceway, the Court instructed the jury as follows: 
(Instruction No. 8.) 
"You are instructed that the defendant Salis-
bury Investment Company constructed the en-
tranceway to the Walgreen Drug Company store 
where plaintiff fell and had the exclusive right 
to change the entranceway and material from 
. which said entranceway was constructed; and if 
you find from'· a prerponderance of the evidence 
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that said entranceway was not constructed or 
maintained in a reasonably 8afe manner in that 
when wet the entranceway became slick, slippery, 
and not reasonably safe to walk upon, and that 
the Salisbury Investment Company knew or in 
the exercise of reasonable care should have known 
of said condition, then the Salisbury Investment 
was negligent; and if you find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that such negligence proximately 
caused injuries to plaintiff, then your verdict 
should be for plaintiff and against defendant 
Salisbury Investment Company unless the plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent. (R. 71.) (Italics 
added.) 
With respect to the duty to give warning of the 
dangerous condition and the duty to cover the entrance-
way with mats or other materials, the Court instructed 
the jury as follows: (Instruction No. 10.) 
"You are instructed that it was the duty of 
defendant Walgreen Drug Company to exercise 
reasonable care to keep the entranceway to its 
store reasonably safe for the use of its customers; 
and in this regard you are instructed that if you 
shall find from a preponderance of t.he evidence 
that the entranceway was not reasonably safe in 
that the floor of the entranceway had become wet 
from rain water and slick and slippery and that 
defendant Walgreen Drug Company knew or in 
the exercise of reasonable care should have known 
of said condition, and failed to exercise reason-
able care to remedy said condition and make said 
entranceway reasonably safe for the use of its 
customers, by means of warning signs to advise 
of the slick condition or by covering the terrazzo 
entrance with rubber mats or other substances 
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Company was negligent; and if such negligence 
proximately caused injuries to plaintiff, then 
your verdict should be for plaintiff and against 
defendant Walgreen Drug Company, unless plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent. (R. 72.) (Italics 
added.) 
It is apparent from a reading of these instructions 
that the Court was of the opinion, and so instructed the 
jury, that only the defendant Salisbury Investment 
Company could be liable for the dangerous construction 
of the entranceway. However, if the entranceway were 
negligently or dangerously constructed, then this de-
fendant would be guilty of negligence if it failed to give 
appropriate warning of the dangerous condition, or to 
take steps to eliminate the dangerous condition, with 
a covering material of some sort. As a prerequisite to 
a finding that the defendant was guilty of negligence, 
it would be necessary for the jury to find that the Salis-
bury Investment Company was guilty of negligence. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defend-
ant Salisbury Investment Company and against the 
plaintiff, no cause of action. By this general verdict the 
jury found in effect that the entranceway to the defend-
ant's store was not dangerous. However, the jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of ~he plaintiff and against 
this defendant in the sum of $8,000.00. The verdict as 
against this defendant is wholly inconsistent with the 
verdict in favor of the defendant Salisbury Investment 
Company. In the one case the jury finds that there is no 
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dangerous condition. In the other case the jury finds 
that this defendant was negligent for failure to give 
warning of the dangerous condition, or for failing to 
remedy it. If there was no dangerous condition, as the 
jury found in regard to Salisbury Investment Company, 
how can this defendant be guilty of negligence for 
failure to warn of the dangerous condition or failure 
to remedy the same~ It is quite a;pparent that the ver-
dict is a sympathetic one and not based on any reason 
or logic-on the contrary it is wholly illogical and un. 
reasonable, and based on wholly inconsistent findings. 
The verdicts as between the two defendants to this 
case are inconsistent with each other and the verdict as 
against this defendant is contrary to the instructions of 
the Court. The instructions of the Court, unexcepted to 
by counsel, are the law of the case, and whether right 
or wrong the jury is bound to follow them. See in this 
connection : 
Baron v. Botsford, (Mont.) 90 P. (2d) 510. 
Rodgers v. Berger, (Ariz.) 103 P. (2d) 266. 
That a verdict must be consistent, is a principle 
which has generally been assumed to exist, but which 
seems to have rarely required a judicial affirmation. 
The cases treating this question seem to be few and 
far between. 53 Am. Jur. 725, Trial, Sec. 1048. Yet plain 
logic and common sense would seem to require the exist-
ence of such a principle. It would be a monstrous rule 
which would permit a jury to decide a case according 
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to its sympathies, without any regard to facts, law, or 
logic. While we recognize that the law is not logic, and 
not always logical, it should not necessarily be illogical, 
and it should not depart from the rules of logic in the 
absence of sound and compelling reasons for so doing. 
No good reason occurs to us why the jury should 
be permitted to play fast and loose with the rights of 
litigants as was done in this case. The conclusion i::; 
irresistable that the verdict in this case is a sympathetic 
one. We cannot know what reasoning prompted the jury 
to exonerate one of two corporate defendants. Assum-
edly the jury concluded that the entranceway was jprop-
erly constructed and was not hazardous. Having so 
found, it should not be permitted to fasten damages 
upon this defendant for failure to give warning of a 
dangerous condition which didn't exist, or failure to 
remedy a dangerous condition which didn't exist. 
In the case of Nelson v. Duquesne Light Company, 
338 Pa. 37, 12 A. (2d) 299, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania was confronted with a somewhat similar prob-
lem. In that case plaintiff's husband had been killed 
while riding as a guest passenger in an automobile 
driven by the defendant Messinger. The defendant Mes-
singer had collided with a utility pole which had been 
erected approximately in the center of the highway by 
the defendant Duquesne Light Company pursuant to 
permission granted by the defendant City of Pittsburgh. 
The plaintiff commenced an action against all defend-
ants for the death of her husband. The jury returned 
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a verdict against the City and in favor of the plaintiff, 
but in favor of the defendant utility company and 
against the plaintiff. The Court held in that case that 
"the verdict against the city as a defendant and in 
favor of the light com:pany as a defendant is, on the 
facts of this case, inconsistent,'' and ordered the judg-
ment set aside and ordered a new trial. The Court went 
on to say: 
"When the case is tried again, the trial judge 
should make it clear to the jury that the liability, 
if any, of the City of Pittsburgh, is only second-
ary to the liability, if any, of the Duquesne Light 
Company, and while, if the facts warrant it, a 
sustainable verdict could be rendered against 
both the city and the Light Company, a sustain-
able verdict could not be rendered against the 
city if the Light Company is exculpated." 
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING DE-
FENDANT'S PROFERRED TESTIMONY TO THE EFFECT 
THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO ACCIDENTS AT THE 
PLACE IN QUESTION DURING THE 15 YEARS PRIOR TO 
THE TRIAL EXCEPT THE ACCIDENT INVOLVING THIS 
PLAINTIFF. 
As is pointed out in the statement of facts herein 
contained, the defendant offered to prove by the testi-
mony of Mr. Conley, the manager of defendant's store, 
that approximately 4000 to 5000 people per day came 
into its store and that in the past fourteen or fifteen 
years, it had never come to the attention of the defend-
ant that anyone had ever slipped on the terrazzo en-
tranceway, either when it was wet or dry. On objection 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
52 
by the plaintiff, this offer of proof was rejected by the 
Court. A similar offer of proof made by the defendant, 
Salisbury Investment Company was also excluded. In 
refusing to admit this proferred evidence, the Court 
committed prejudicial error .. 
The general rule, as stated in 1 Shearman & Redfield 
on Negligence, 168, Sec. 59, is as follows: 
"The fact that [)remises or appliances have 
been used for many years by many persons, with-
out injury, or that no evidence was produced 
that any other person than the plaintiff had been 
injured, is a strong circumstance in disproof of 
negligence in the use of such premises or appli-
ances. It is error to exclude testimony that there 
had been no prior complaints of a dangerous con-
dition.'' 
Some Courts have gone so far as to hold, that such 
t{>roof is conclusive of the question. We do not here 
contend that such proof would be conclusive on the 
question of negligence, but we do contend that such 
proof is admissible and is entitled to strong weight in 
determining the question of negligence or non-negli-
gence on the part of this defendant. 
The case of Mullen v. Sensenbrenner Mere. Co. 
(Mo.) 260 S.W. 982, has heretofore been cited and dis-
cussed at some length. In that case, evidence that the 
defendant's entranceway had been in use for a period 
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of about four years; that thousands of people had 
passed over it, and that no other person had ever been 
injured by slipping or other·wise, was held to be con-
clusive proof that the entranceway was not unreason-
ably unsafe. Said the Court : 
''As to whether the tile was so slick as to be 
dangerous: Defendant's evidence is that the tile 
floor was put down in 1915, and this accident 
happened four years afterward, and that in the 
meantime thousands of people must have passed 
over it before plaintiff was injured, and also 
after !plaintiff was injured, up to the time of the 
trial, and that no other person was injured there-
on by slipping or otherwise, although it was al-
ways in the same condition as when plaintiff was 
injured. Such evidence conclusively shows that 
said tile was not so slick, or said entrance so 
sloping, or the crack therein so large or of such 
character as not to be reasonably safe, without 
rugs or sawdust or any other covering thereon." 
(Italics added.) · 
In the case of Lappin v. St. Louis National League 
Baseball Club, 33 S.W. (2d) 1025, heretofore cited and 
discussed, the Court said: 
''In this case, as in the Main case, supra, 
there is no evidence that defendant had pre-
viously known of any dangerous condition of the 
stairway; in fact, according to the testimony of 
a witness who was in a position to know, in the 
twelve years of his connection with the park 
there had been no previous accident at this stair-
way." 
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In the case of City of Drumright v. Moore, (Okla.), 
170 Pac. (2d) 230, the Court said: 
"The undisputed testimony is, that it, [the 
entranceway] had existed as a part of the build-
ing for some 25 years during which time a large 
number of people had passed through the door-
way without sustaining any injury because of its 
location. This is strong, if not conclusive evi-
dence, that its maintenance in the doorway by 
the city was not negligence." 
In the case of State Planters Bank and Trust Com-
pany v. Gans, (Va.), 200 S.E. 591, plaintiff was injured 
while entering defendant's bank building. In that case 
the evidence showed, that more than six hu.ndred per-
sons had used the entranceway daily for more than 
eleven years prior to the time of trial, and that during 
that time, the :plaintiff was the only person known to 
have been injured on the steps. The Court held, that 
such proof was practically conclusive that the steps 
were reasonably safe, quoting with approval from the 
case of Mullen v. Sensenbrenner Mere .Co., supra. 
In the case of Haleem v. Gold, 164 N.Y.S. 119, the 
plaintiff was injured on an entrance platform in front 
of the defendant's store. The entrance platform had 
been in use for twenty-five years prior to that time, and 
during that time, no person had ever been injured by 
using it. It was held that the defendant had no reason 
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to suppose that such entrance platform would suddenly 
become a source of danger. 
Said the Court : 
''Several hundred people walk over it every 
day and during the twenty-five years of its use, 
no one ever heard of an injury. I find here no 
basis for a charge of negligence. Defendant had 
no reason to suppose that a platform used in 
safety for so many years, would suddenly be-
come a source of danger and it is familiar law 
that one cannot be chargeable with negligence 
who has no notice or means of notice that a thing 
maintained by him can be the cause of injury." 
In Tryon v. Chalmers, 205 App. Div. 816, 200 N.Y.S. 
362, the Court said: 
''As a general rule, where a structure, not 
obviously dangerous, has been in daily use for 
years, as had this stairway in question, and has 
uniformly been safe, its use may be continued 
without the imputation of culpable imprudence 
and carelessness. Lafflin v. B. & S. R. R. Co., 106 
N. Y. 136, 141, 12 N.E. 599, 60 Am. Rep. 433. It 
is not shown that there had ever been an acci-
dent on this stairway before. The· fact that 
scores of customers have used this stairway daily 
for years was potent assurance to these defend-
ants that it was reasonably safe. There was no 
duty resting upon the defendants which required 
that they so provide for the safety of customers 
that they shall meet no danger when on the 
premises. The defendants are not insurers of 
their customers' safety.'' 
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In DeSalvo v. Stanley-Mark-Strand Conporation (N. 
Y.) 23 N.E. (2d) 457, following a long line of earlier 
New York Cases, the Court, speaking through Crane, 
Chief Justice, said : 
"\Yhen a well known architect constructs a 
theatre in accordance with the approval of the 
building department, and also similar to like 
classes of structures, and the theatre as built has 
been safe in constant use for many years, the 
mere fact of the happening of an accident, is not 
sufficient to cast responsibility for faulty con-
struction upon the owners. * * * The theatre had 
a capacity of 2,758 peo:ple. It had been operating 
for 23 years at the time of the accident, during 
the course of which hundreds of thousands of 
men, women and children passed by the opening 
and railing without mishap. As stated before, 
there was no proof of previous accidents in the 
mezzanine, and the manager of the theatre testi-
fied that for 15 years that he had been there, 
there had been no accidents." 
''Continued user for a long period of time 
without any accident negatived negligence aris-
ing out of claimed faulty construction." 
The Court quoted with approval from Loftus v. 
Union Ferry Co. of Brooklyn, 84 N. Y. 455, 38 Am. Rep. 
533: 
''The company had the experience of years 
certifying to the sufficiency of the. guard. That 
it was possible for a child or even a man to get 
through the opening was apparent enough. But 
that this was likely to occur was negatived by the 
fact that multitudes of persons had passed over 
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the bridge without the occurrence of such a 
casualty. • • • We think the exerpption of the de-
fendant in the case rests u;pon the fact . . . that 
the company had no reason to apprehend an acci-
dent like this, ... '' 
The Court also quoted with approval from La fflin 
v. Buffalo & S. TV. R. R. Co., 106 N.Y. 136, 12 N.E. 599: 
"No structure is ever so made that it may not 
be made safer. But as a general rule, when an 
appliance, or machine or structure not obviously 
dangerous, has been in daily use for years, and 
has uniformly proved adequate, safe, and con-
venient, its use may be continued without the 
imputation of culpable imprudence or careless-
ness.'' 
In Rothstein v. Monette, 17 N.Y.S. (2d) 369, (1940), 
it appeared that plaintiff entered defendant's restaurant 
for breakfast on a morning when it was raining very 
hard. She was carrying an umbrella, but she could not 
recall whether or not she wor~ rubbers. After entering, 
she closed her umbrella and was about to reach for a 
check on the counter when her foot slipped on the wet 
floor. She twisted her side and struck against the 
counter but did not fall. The claim was made. that the 
terrazzo floor was wet and muddy and also that there 
was a slight depression in the floor. The jury rendered 
a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed 
from a judgment entered thereon. In affirming the 
judgment, the reviewing court said: 
"The fact that scores of customers had 
walked over the floor daily and safely from the 
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time it was laid was assurance to the defendant 
that it was reasonably safe. He is not an insurer 
of the safety of his customers. . . . It has been 
held, and it is commonly known to laymen that 
floors and steps constructed of tile, marble, ter-
razzo and hardwood have a smooth surface and 
are slippery, especially when wet. But their use 
is not negligent or unlawful, and if people fall 
because the surface is hard and smooth there is 
no liability, a person being required to use care 
to avoid slipping.'' 
In the case of Garland v. Furst Store, 93 N.J.L. 127, 
~07 A. 38, the plaintiff slipped on a concrete floor in the 
basement of the defendant's store. The floor was shown 
to be in good condition and the evidence showed that it 
had been traversed by thousands of people every week 
for four years, prior to the accident, and that no one 
had ever been known to slip on it before. Said the 
Court: 
''The floor was undoubtedly smooth but ap-
parently was not slippery as it had been traversed 
by thousands of people every week for four years 
since its construction and no one had been known 
to slip there before. It would thus appear that 
the premises were reasonably safe for the entry 
thereon of persons resorting to the store, and it 
is not shown that the defendant was guilty of 
any act which would make them dangerous. In 
fact there is no contention to that effect.'' 
In the case of Lawson v. D. H. Holmes Co. Ltd., 
(La.) 200 So. 163, heretofore cited and discussed, the 
defendant's evidence showed that the entranceway to 
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its store had been in use many years prior to the acci-
dent; that thousands of people walked over it daily, and 
there had never been a complaint with respect to its 
condition and no accient ever occured there before. Said 
the Court: 
"The defendant's testimony was, that thous-
ands of people walked over this slab each day; 
that they have been doing so for many years; that 
there have been no complaints, and no other acci-
dent has ever occurred. This to our minds is a 
strong circumstance which must be considered by 
us in determining the condition of the step.'' 
(Italics added.) 
In the case of J. C. Penney Company, Inc., v. 1!1aude 
Robison, 128 0. St. 626, 193 N.E. 401, the Court said: 
''Thousands of people patronized this store 
every day. No one else is shown to have fallen 
there. No one claims that any one else ever fell 
by reason of the oiling of the floors.'' 
The Court also made the following pertinent ob-
servation: 
''We agree that the right of trial by jury is 
guaranteed to all citizens by the Constitution of 
Ohio, and it cannot be invaded or violated by 
legislative act or judicial decree; but all this does 
not mean that all cases, regardless of evidentiary 
aspect, must be submitted to a jury. Under our 
law it is just as pernicious to submit a case to a 
jury and permit the jury to speculate with the 
rights of citizens when no question for the jury 
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is involved, as it is to deny to a citizen his trial 
by jury when he has the right.'' 
The rules laid down by the above cited and quoted 
cases, are in accord with sound reasoning. It is diffi-
cult to conceive what better evidence of the safe condi-
tion of the premises could be adduced than the fact 
that the premises had been safely used in the same con-
dition for a long period of time. Certainly a period of 
fourteen or fifteen years is more than sufficient time 
in which to test the safety of the entranceway. If this 
entranceway had been hazardous, as the !plaintiff con-
tends, other persons would have slipped on it and fallen, 
sustaining injuries. It is a matter of common knowledge, 
of which the Court can take judicial. notice, that for a 
considerable portion of the calendar year, the streets 
of Salt Lake City are covered with rain or snow. When-
ever this condition occurs, water is invariably tracked 
into mercantile houses, including this defendant's storP. 
Yet, in all the past fourteen or fifteen years, there has 
never been any accident in the entranceway to this store. 
It is no answer to say that on other occasions when 
the weather was wet a rubber mat was placed in front 
of the door. While it is true that there is evidence in 
the record that on previous occasions when it had been 
storming, a rubber mat had been placed out by the de-
fendant, the evidence further shows, that the mat was 
in front of the revolving doo'rs only, and did not cover 
the entire surface of the entranceway, and it particularly 
did not cover the portion of the entranceway in front 
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of the doors on either side of the revolving doors. As-
sumedly, the plaintiff would not have used the rubber 
mat even if it had been out since she elected to enter 
the store throug-h the door at the side of the revolving 
door, rather than through the revolving- door. In any 
event, a substantial portion of the entranceway is never 
covered with rubber mats, and this portion of the en-
tranceway is also traversed by the public. 
By refusing to permit the defendants to show the 
long record of safe use of the entranceway, the Court 
deprived them of some of their most convincing evi-
dence. It might well be, that if the Court had permitted 
the defendants to make the ·proof which they offered to 
make, that the jury would have returned a verdict in 
favor of both defendants. The denial of this right, was 
erroneous and highly prejudicial to the defendant's 
defense. 
Not only would this evidence be rna terial as to the 
relative safety of the entranceway-it would also be 
material to show want of notice on the part of defend-
ant that there was any dangerous condition in connec-
tion with its entranceway. 
CONCLUSION 
The record is entirely free of any evidence of negli-
gence on the part of this defendant. On the contrary, 
the record shows conclusively that the entranceway to 
the defendant's store was of the safest possible type 
of construction. Under the principles of generally ae-
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cepted law, there was no duty on the part of the defend-
ant to give warning of the wet condition of the entrance-
way. Such a warning would have been futile and would 
have conveyed to the plaintiff no information which she 
did not already possess. Moreover, the jury found by 
its verdict of no cause of action in favor of the defend-
ant, Salisbury Investment Company, that the entrance-
way was in fact of a safe type of construction. Its ver-
dict against this defendant was inconsistent, violative 
of the instructions of the Court and contrary to law. 
For these reasons the judgment of the trial court should 
bs reversed, and the trial court should be directed to 
enter a judgment in favor of this defendant, no cause 
of action. 
Even if the Court should be of the opinion, that the 
above contentions of the defendant are not well taken, 
the judgment should, in any event, be reversed and a 
new trial granted, because of prejudicial error by the 
-Court in excluding defendant's proferred evidence on 
the long history of safe use of the entranceway to the 
premises. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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